In the case of People v. Penson, it was held that a valid arrest may be made solely by reason of information communicated by a reliable informant as above defined herein. In the case just cited, the court stated: ‘The officers’ appraisal of the informant’s reliability was based upon the truthfulness of prior reports from this person which they had verified upon investigation.’ And in Trowbridge v. Superior Court, this court said: ‘that it is not the number of informers involved but the reliability of the informant and reasonableness of the information supplied which should count the most with the officer in making up his mind what to do.’ Under the facts and circumstances here present we entertain no doubt that the reliability of the informant was established.
That the officer’s recognition of the informant’s voice is competent evidence and a circumstance to be considered in the matter of identification is firmly established. Identity of a person is permitted by evidence solely of recognition of a voice. It is universally recognized that the voice as well as the physical appearance of a person, is a means by which identification is made possible, therefore testimony relating to the identity of the voice is competent, its probative value being a question of fact for the jury.
The apprehension of respondent that to justify his arrest would open the door to police officers to utilize fictitious informants in order to perpetrate illegal searches and seizures is answered by the court Lorenzen v. Superior Court, wherein it is stated: ‘An additional contention made by petitioner is answered in People v. Garnett: ‘Appellant assumes that police officers would, to suit their convenience, make use of fictitious informants as bases for illegal searches and seizures. Such assumption is unauthorized and is contrary to statutory presumptions that official duty has been regularly performed and that the law has been obeyed. When an officer has in good faith testified that he had acted upon the information of an unnamed person and that such informant was reliable, he has thereby established a firm basis for his search of a suspect’s premises. So long as the good faith of the arresting officer with respect to the reliability of his informant satisfies the scrutiny of the trial judge, he is in substantially the same position as if he had come with a warrant of arrest.”
Respondent relies heavily upon the case of Priestly v. Superior Court. To us it appears that this case does not aid him. In the Priestly case, an ‘information’ charged defendant with possession of narcotics. At the preliminary examination, an officer testified that acting solely on the information from two informers, he and another officer went to defendant’s apartment and knocked on the door. After some ten minutes defendant opened the door, whereupon the officers placed him under arrest and searched his person and the apartment. They found narcotics upon his person and in a dresser drawer. The arrest and search were made without a warrant. Defendant contended ‘this testimony was not competent since he objected to it, demanding that the identity of the informers be disclosed or the officer’s testimony be struck.’ The Supreme Court held that the communications of the informers was material to the issue of reasonable cause to make the arrest and search. Defendant’s motion that the identity of the informant be disclosed or the officer’s testimony be struck was denied by the magistrate and he was held to answer. When arraigned in the superior court defendant moved to set aside the ‘information’ on the ground that the evidence against him was obtained by illegal search and seizure. Upon the denial of his motion defendant sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from further proceedings on the ‘information’. The writ was granted.
